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Rethinking non-recognition: Taiwan’s new pivot to
ASEAN and the one-China policy
Pasha L. Hsieh
Singapore Management University
Abstract The article examines the evolution of Taiwan’s engagement in Southeast
Asia since the 1990s as a unique case study in international law and international
relations (IR). Under the one-China policy, the evolution of bilateral relations with
Taiwan highlights the theoretical concept of recognition premised on identity and
status in interstate affairs. The article argues that the states of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have established diverse forms of recognition of
Taiwan in line with a policy of non-recognition. While such recognition has not
amounted to recognition of statehood in international law, it demonstrates the IR
concept of recognition as a gradual process in state practice. To substantiate the
contention, the article examines the diplomatic privileges and immunities that ASEAN
countries have accorded to Taiwan. The conclusion of bilateral trade and investment
agreements has also galvanized various modes of recognizing Taiwan’s treaty-making
capacity and the legitimacy of official cooperation. Hence, the findings not only enrich
the study of IR, but also contribute to a broader understanding of the role of China and
contemporary Asia–Pacific politics.
Introduction
The development of Taiwan’s relations with the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) states provides a unique case study in international
relations (IR) and international law. ASEAN countries uphold respective one-
China policies that legally recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as
the sole legitimate government of China. Nonetheless, their non-diplomatic
relations with Taiwan reflect diverse forms of recognition in IR. Distinct from
the legal view that clearly demarcates recognition and non-recognition,
ASEAN–Taiwan interactions reinforce the IR notion of recognition as a gradual
process (Geis 2015, 15–17). This practice is illustrated at the level of diplomatic
privileges and immunities granted to Taiwan and in the conclusion of trade
and investment agreements with it since the 1990s.
In 2016, Taiwan’s new president, Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), announced the ASEAN-focused New Southbound
Policy (NSP) (Jing 2016a, 204–206; Glaser et al 2018, 1–2). This article will critic-
ally assess Taiwan’s evolving engagement with Southeast Asia. In doing so it
will highlight the theoretical concept of recognition using an interdisciplinary
IR and international law perspective, each of which perspectives has over-
looked the other for decades (Agne et al 2013, 96). This research will also
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enrich the understanding of China’s escalating influence in the contemporary
geopolitics of the Asia–Pacific.
Using emerging IR literature on recognition, this article sheds light on the
tensions and compatibility between ASEAN states’ one-China policies and
their substantial relations with Taiwan. The article argues that ASEAN states
have established diverse forms of recognizing Taiwan in bilateral relations.
Such recognition underlines the IR concept of recognition, which is premised
on identity and status, and functions in line with ASEAN’s non-recognition
policy that minimizes potential conflicts with China. The fact that these modes
of recognition encompass legal consequences but do not amount to recognition
of statehood in international law evidences the gradual process of recognition
in IR.
Tellingly, international lawyers deem recognition of statehood to be a pol-
icy that gives rise to significant legal effects (Chen 1951, 118; Crawford 2006,
3–4; Damrosch and Murphy 2014, 282–288). To illustrate, the signing of treaties
is mostly conditioned on recognition of statehood and an entity’s entitlement
to privileges and immunities in domestic law rests upon diplomatic relations
that follow formal recognition (Crawford 2012, 129–130, 369–370; Von Glahn
and Taulbee 2013, 366–375). Notwithstanding the absence of diplomatic recog-
nition, ASEAN states have recognized Taiwan’s legal capacity by conferring
diverse privileges and immunities on its diplomats and de facto embassies, as
well as by concluding bilateral economic agreements. This practice of recogni-
tion not only makes Taiwan a rare case under the international legal norm, but
also crystalizes what can be ‘recognized‘ within the space of ASEAN’s non-rec-
ognition policy.
After this introduction, the article is divided into five sections. The first sec-
tion introduces GWF Hegel’s philosophical grounding of recognition theory
and its impact on the concepts of recognition and non-recognition in inter-
national law and IR. It further elucidates the theoretical framework of the
research on states’ ‘struggles for recognition‘, which has been developed by
scholars such as Axel Honneth, Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (Wolf
2011, 105–116; Lindemann 2014, 483–484; Duncombe 2015, 625–626; Friedrich
2016, 65–66). The second section reviews Taiwan’s former ‘Go South’ policy
that underpins the current NSP. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations with
Taiwan due to the one-China policy, ASEAN states’ intensive economic ties
with Taiwan have enhanced its identity and status.
The third section deciphers the degrees of diplomatic privileges and
immunities that ASEAN countries have granted to Taiwan and analyses an
intertwined issue of Taiwan’s claims of sovereign immunity in judicial pro-
ceedings. These factors are critical to implementing the NSP. The following
section assesses the impact of non-recognition on Taiwan’s trade and invest-
ment agreements. By examining Taiwan’s recent agreements with Singapore
and the Philippines, it explores the challenges for potential accession to the
new Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the ASEAN-based Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).1 Finally, the last section
1 After the US withdrawal, the remaining 11 parties renamed the Trans-Pacific Partnership
the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and concluded it
in 2018.
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concludes by providing policy and legal implications of recognition theory
with regard to Taiwan’s relations with Southeast Asia and the rest of the
Asia–Pacific.
The theory and policy on recognition and non-recognition
The following section deciphers ASEAN’s non-recognition policy towards
Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), as a logical corollary
of the one-China policy that only recognizes the People’s Republic of China
as the ‘real China’. Using Hegel’s concept of recognition, I construct a theoret-
ical framework to analyse the relationship between recognition and non-recog-
nition in Taiwan’s relations with ASEAN. Conventionally, recognition and
non-recognition have been viewed as clear opposites in international law and
politics. However, ASEAN states’ distinct modes of recognition of Taiwan, as
illustrated in its diplomatic privileges and immunities, as well as in the signing
of trade and investment pacts, demonstrates the relative nature of the IR con-
cept of recognition which international lawyers often neglect (Geis 2015,
16–17). This finding also fills a gap in IR literature because these forms of rec-
ognition, despite being distinguishable from recognition of statehood, are not
informal and have salient legal repercussions. Hence, while tensions have
emerged between recognition and non-recognition, the co-existence of these
two concepts in interstate affairs is not inconceivable.
Since its founding in 1967, ASEAN has played an increasingly prominent
role in the Asia–Pacific, particularly amid China–US (United States) conflicts.
The diversity of the ten-country bloc in Southeast Asia and its rising economic
and geopolitical significance provide an exceptional context in which to assess
Taiwan’s external relations. Following the Kuomintang (KMT)’s loss of control
over Mainland China and the ROC government’s relocation to Taiwan in 1949,
several ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) switched
recognition to Beijing in the 1950s and 1960s.2 In 1971, the United Nations
(UN) General Assembly Resolution 2758 replaced the ROC with the PRC and
in 1979US President Jimmy Carter decided to recognize Beijing. These events
aggravated the de-recognition of Taiwan among US allies, including Malaysia,
the Philippines and Thailand. After Indonesian President Suharto’s decision to
normalize relations with the PRC in 1990, Singapore followed accordingly
(Severino 2006, 277). In 1991, Brunei became the last ASEAN member to recog-
nize Beijing.
The PRC’s engagement with ASEAN as a bloc has accelerated since the
1990s when Beijing became a dialogue partner (Severino 2006, 277–278). To ful-
fil Beijing’s core interests, the ASEAN–China joint statements often stress that
‘ASEAN’ or its ‘member states’ reaffirm adherence to the one-China policy.3
Article 41 of the ASEAN Charter mandates that ASEAN members ‘develop
2 For the list of dates when diplomatic relations with the PRC were established see (中华人民
共和国与各国建立外交关系日期简表 ) (as of August 2018), <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/
ziliao_674904/2193_674977/>, accessed 10 April 2019.
3 See, for example, Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the
Member States of ASEAN and the President of the People’s Republic of China Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia (1997), para 9 and Joint Statement of the 14th ASEAN–China Summit to Commemorate
the 20th Anniversary of Dialogue Relations (2011), para 34.
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common positions and pursue joint actions’ and the one-China policy arguably
falls with the ambit of this coordination principle. Nevertheless, neither
ASEAN as an organization nor its member states have clarified the permissible
extent of non-diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Notably, ASEAN’s policy on
Taiwan is different from the legal principle of collective non-recognition, which
denotes the illegality of unrecognized regimes because of egregious violations
of international law (Crawford 2012, 155–156; Ker-Lindsay 2012, 12–15).
ASEAN’s non-recognition of the ROC denies the ROC’s representation of
‘China’, but by no means regards the Taiwan government as illegal.
I now turn to the theoretical framework that I will use to assess ASEAN’s
non-recognition policy towards Taiwan and their bilateral engagement. In pol-
itical theory, recognition and its negative counterpart, misrecognition, are
rooted in Hegel’s recognition theory. According to Hegel, human behaviour is
motivated by seeking recognition from peers instead of pre-eminence (Hegel
1977, 111; Blunden 2007, 90–96). As elucidated in his master–slave dialectic,
reciprocal recognition is critical to the establishment of self-consciousness
(Ringmar 1995, 94; Hayden and Schick 2016, 3–4). The existence of the ‘self’
thus depends on and is defined by the acknowledgement of the ‘other’ (Fraser
2003, 23). Although Hegel focused predominantly on interpersonal relation-
ships, he provided an account of interstate relations in which recognition of
statehood is essential to gain an international legal personality (Kochi 2016,
95). Recognition by foreign states is thus a prerequisite for an entity to be a
sovereign (Ringmar 1995, 94; Hutchings 2011, 133).
The non-recognition of states has also played a critical role in international
law and IR (Kochi 2016, 95). Just as in Hegel’s interpretation of the interper-
sonal relationship, non-recognition in interstate affairs implies a negation of
the ‘other’ and establishes differences between states (Brincat 2014, 403;
Lindemann 2014, 490–491). Although it is common for political scientists to
refer to misrecognition and non-recognition interchangeably, they are concep-
tually different. Derived from political theory, misrecognition is a normative
concept that stresses the mismatch between self-identity and the recognition of
the other. Misrecognition is thus often perceived as an act of injustice and dis-
respect (Geis 2015, 7–9).
Non-recognition, which signifies a denial of recognition, may be seen as
misrecognition from the view of states that quest for recognition. However, in
essence, the IR concept of non-recognition denotes a relatively neutral stance
that is used to balance geopolitical interests. A policy of non-recognition can
be implemented in the form of collective sanctions pursuant to the legal prin-
ciple of non-recognition (Crawford 2012, 155). The policy objective is to reduce
the effectiveness of situations created by violations of peremptory norms of
international law such as the forcible acquisition of territory. By contrast, par-
ticularly in the case of Taiwan, a policy of non-recognition represents a modus
vivendi in which the legality of an entity is not judged (Lindemann 2014, 490;
Newman and Visoka 2018, 773). The space of non-recognition allows for flexi-
bility and engagement in the state-centric system (Richards and Smith 2015,
166–167). On the one hand, states’ struggles for recognition in response to non-
recognition can lead to interstate conflicts (Murray 2012, 134–135; Brincat 2014,
403–404; Geis 2015, 9–14). On the other hand, a policy of non-recognition helps
facilitate stability in the international order (Oeter 2015, 134). This policy
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mostly refers to non-recognition of statehood but can also extend to the scope
of engagement that involves non-statehood or non-diplomatic arenas.
The study of recognition is rooted in Hegel’s contribution to political theory
in the post-1945 era. Critical theorists, such as Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser
and Charles Taylor, centred the struggles for recognition on the domestic
realm and propelled social movements towards racial and sexual equality
(Blunden 2007, 90–96; McBribe 2013, 2–4). From the 2000s, the burgeoning lit-
erature on recognition began a new wave of the cross-disciplinary transfer
from political science to IR and elevated recognition theory to international
dimensions (Erman 2013, 130; Fehl 2015, 104–105; Friedrich 2016, 65–66). As
Wendt contended, the neorealist assumption that states struggle for security in
anarchy is insufficient to comprehend contemporary interstate affairs (Wendt
2003, 510–512; Greenhill 2008, 348–349). The Hegelian way of understanding
national conflicts has therefore been extended to explain states’ behaviour
motivated by their desire for recognition.
This new perspective of recognition facilitates a re-examination of Taiwan’s
NSP and its new pivot to Southeast Asia in light of ASEAN’s non-recognition
policy. Along these lines, a dynamic group of IR scholars, including
Lindemann, Ringmar and Wolf, have theoretically and empirically validated
Wendt’s hypothesis by crystallizing the IR concept of recognition (Lindemann
2012, 209–219; Erman 2013, 133–134; Fikencher et al 2015, 91–100). Based on
Hegel’s view that identity construction is developed through mutual recogni-
tion, the emerging IR concept of recognition was initially subscribed to con-
structivist ontology. This psychological approach to interpreting state
behaviour is transplanted from ‘identity politics’ that clarifies individuals’
search for recognition of their identities in an intersubjective social process
(Fraser 2003, 23–24). Rather than maximizing its material power, a state’s psy-
chological desire for having its identity recognized on par with its self-image
often prompts actions (Wendt 2003, 510–511; Geis 2015, 4–5).
The constructive turn in construing the IR concept of recognition soon
encountered criticism that the identity-dominated interpretation of recognition
‘runs the danger of suffering from too psychological an understanding of the
term‘ (Iser 2015, 27–29). To provide a more balanced and comprehensive inves-
tigation, Wolf and other IR theorists propounded a concurrent element of rec-
ognition that emphasizes ‘the status dimensions of recognition’ (Wolf 2011,
107). This notion can be traced back to Fraser’s justice-oriented ‘principle of
participatory parity’, which aimed to mitigate inequality by assessing whether
individuals and their peers were on equal footing (Fraser 2003, 101; Blunden
2007, 92–96; Fehl 2015, 108–109). Unlike identity construction, a status claim
emphasizes the struggle for dignity (Wolf 2011, 106; Lindemann 2012, 210;
Gustafsson 2016, 257). The desire for status galvanizes states to demand
acknowledgement pursuant to the normative standards of respect in bilateral
and multilateral ties. In state practice, identity and status dimensions may be
intertwined because recognition of identity can also be motivated by the quest
for dignity or respect.
Since the nineteenth century, the concept of recognition in international law
has significantly diverged from its counterpart in IR. It is crucial that recogni-
tion not be confused with sovereignty or statehood, even though these ideas
are conceptually interrelated. Sovereignty most commonly refers to an entity’s
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legal competence (Crawford 2012, 448). Recognition has been construed to rep-
resent a key dimension of sovereignty: international legal sovereignty (Krasner
1999, 14–15; Fanoulis and Musliu 2018, 72–73). However, neither sovereignty
nor recognition is a precondition for statehood. The legal discourse on recogni-
tion of statehood predominantly centres on the constitutive–declaratory binary.
The constitutive theory built upon Hegel’s idea avers that the statehood of
an entity hinges on recognition (Lauterpacht 1944, 419–422; Onuf 2013, 124).
Lassa Oppenheim elaborated this positivist view that recognition completes
statehood and is thus indispensable to the creation of a state as an inter-
national person (Oppenheim 1955, 125; Crawford 2006, 19–21). In contrast, the
declaratory theory posits that recognition simply functions as a formal
acknowledgement of statehood (Crawford 2012, 145–146). In this view, the
existence of a state is a fact and cannot be influenced by recognition. It has
been criticized that ‘the core of the constitutive theory is unacceptable’ because
states cannot unilaterally decide their legal obligations towards other states by
withholding recognition (Brownlie 1983, 206).
State and treaty practices established that the declaratory theory prevails
over the constitutive theory in international law (Brownlie 1983, 205; Talmon
2005, 106–107; Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
1933, article 3). IR scholars have taken note of this legal position, but contend
that such legal recognition merely encompasses ‘a small parcel of the overall
range of social practices of recognition’ (Oeter 2015, 125). To better understand
state behaviour, they look beyond the pursuit of diplomatic recognition and
urge a constitutive analysis of recognition via states’ identity construction and
status claims (Ong 2012, 517–518; Bartelson 2013, 115–117; Erman 2013, 133;
Iser 2015, 36–37). Interestingly, this stance reinforces some legal scholars’ argu-
ment that ‘[r]ecognition, while declaratory of an existing fact, is constitutive in
its nature’ (Jennings and Watts 1996, 133). As international lawyers have
recently found, the validity of the constitutive aspect cannot be ignored par-
ticularly in domestic legal proceedings (International Law Association
2018, 10).
A policy of non-recognition is not tantamount to rendering unrecognized
states a nullity in law (Talmon 2005, 147; Coppieters 2018, 15). This is of sig-
nificance to the evolution of ASEAN–Taiwan relations. IR scholars envision
the absence of recognition as humiliating and provoking conflicts (Wolf 2011,
107–108; Murray 2012, 135). However, as this article demonstrates, certain
forms of legal recognition do not imply recognition of statehood. These forms
that accord Taiwan prestige and dignity in bilateral ties have avoided poten-
tial conflicts and made cooperation possible. One such form is recognition of
privileges and immunities for Taiwan’s diplomatic premises and personnel.
Despite the declaratory theory, the doctrine that the conferral of privileges
and immunities hinges on diplomatic recognition fortifies the importance of
constitutive analysis in domestic law. The rationale for according privileges
and immunities is not just to respect sovereign equality, but also to allow
foreign states and officials to effectively fulfil their diplomatic functions with-
out interventions. Without providing diplomatic recognition and relations,
certain ASEAN states exceptionally granted Taiwan legal rights ‘as if’ it
was recognized.
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Another form of recognition is the conclusion of free trade agreements
(FTAs) and bilateral investment agreements (BIAs). Significantly, the ‘capacity
to enter into relations with other states’ is a key criterion of statehood
(Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933, article 1).
The inking of such agreements similarly guarantees the rights of Taiwanese
investors. Unlike acknowledging Taiwan’s statehood, ASEAN’s non-recogni-
tion policy permits recognition of Taiwan’s treaty-making capacity and the
legitimacy of its law and regulations. Hence, these constitutive effects collect-
ively corroborate the IR stance that recognition is not confined to recognition
of statehood and a gradual view of recognition should be understood through
the psychological and normative lenses of the identity and status dimensions.
ASEAN’s non-recognition vis-a-vis Taiwan’s engagement
Based on recognition theory, the article assesses Taiwan’s approach to engag-
ing with ASEAN within the space of non-diplomatic relations that are
restricted by the one-China policy. Going beyond the realist assumption, the
article explores Taipei’s NSP based on its previous Go South policy and exam-
ines the Taiwanese government’s success in breaking through the conventional
practice of non-recognition. These policies have resulted in various forms of
legal recognition, as evidenced by the recognition of privileges and immunities
and the conclusion of FTAs and BIAs since the 1990s. The analysis therefore
enhances the constitutive understanding of ASEAN–Taiwan relations and the
convergence of IR and international law.
The DPP’s victory over the KMT in Taiwan’s presidential election in 2016
shifted former President Ma Ying-jeou’s priority to improving cross-strait rela-
tions. Tsai introduced the Southeast-Asia-focused NSP as a presidential candi-
date at the DPP’s 2015 diplomatic reception (Tsai 2015). In her inaugural
address in 2016, Tsai elaborated that the NSP is meant ‘to elevate the scope
and diversity of our external economy, and to bid farewell to our past overre-
liance on a single market’. She thus implicitly criticized the KMT for worsen-
ing Taiwan’s dependence on China.
Beijing interpreted Tsai’s refusal to recognize the 1992 consensus on ‘one
China, different interpretations’ as a pro-independence move. The situation
was further aggravated by the unprecedented phone call between Tsai and US
President-elect Donald Trump in 2016 (Blanchard 2016). China vigorously pro-
tested a Twitter post in which Trump referred to Tsai as ‘The President of
Taiwan’ as a violation of the one-China policy (Chandran 2016). In response,
Beijing has maximized its pressure on the DPP government by squeezing
Taiwan’s international space. The Xi Jinping administration has lured five of
Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to switch recognition to Beijing since 2016. The loss
of Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador in 2018 caused the
number of countries that recognize the ROC to dwindle to 17, signifying the
nadir of Taiwan’s diplomatic relations since 1949 (Jiang 2018).
Against this backdrop, the NSP rose as a strategy to counter China’s
‘bullying’ and a manifestation of Taiwan’s ‘struggles for recognition’.
Importantly, rather than focusing on recognition of its statehood, Taiwan has
sought reciprocal recognition of prestige and dignity in relations with ASEAN
states. Many have perceived the NSP to be building upon the three waves of
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the Go South policy implemented during the presidencies of Lee Teng-hui and
Chen Shui-bian from 1994 to 2008 (Ngeow 2017, 114–119; Glaser et al 2018,
6–9).4 Lee’s Go South policy commenced in 1994 with the Operation Outline
for Strengthening Economic and Trade Relations with Southeast Asia. His
political goal was to promote the ‘pragmatic policy’ to upgrade relations
with ASEAN states, which had recognized Beijing. This stance marked a
shift from the rigid one-China policy of the Chiang regime that essentially
isolated Taiwan. As an ‘Asian Tiger’, Taiwan’s soaring labour costs in the
1980s prompted companies in the manufacturing sector to move factories
overseas (Ku 2005, 2). To curb the ‘China fever’ that escalated investments in
China, Lee restricted the scope of West-bound investment under its ‘no
haste, be patient’ policy and urged Taiwanese investments to focus on
Southeast Asia instead (Liaw 2016, 453–454). After 2000, Chen largely fol-
lowed Lee’s Go South policy.
These initiatives made Taiwan a leading investor in ASEAN countries and
provided a context for enhancing government-to-government interactions irre-
spective of ASEAN’s non-recognition of Taiwan under the one-China policy.
Yet, both Lee’s and Chen’s policies failed to alter the direction of Taiwan’s out-
bound investment. The disastrous impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and
the 2008 global financial crisis on Southeast Asia, as well as investment incen-
tives that China provided, actually increased China-bound investments (Jing
2016, 195; Ngeow 2017, 113–115). Unexpectedly, even though President Ma
pushed to enhance cross-strait trade agreements, Taiwan’s investment in China
has decreased since 2010 (DBS Bank 2016, 1). In contrast, Taiwan’s exports to
Southeast Asia soared by more than 290 per cent from 2001 to 2013, making
ASEAN Taiwan’s second-largest trade partner (Yeh and Yi-Lan 2015). These
trends are in part due to China’s economic slowdown, increasing environmen-
tal costs and the rapid growth of the ASEAN market.
These new economic and geopolitical changes invigorated the Tsai adminis-
tration to allocate the significant budget of US$241 million to the NSP in 2018,
a 63 per cent increase from the previous year (Marston and Bush 2018).
Although China and Hong Kong still account for almost 40 per cent of
Taiwan’s external trade, the ten ASEAN states’ collective share has increased
to 15 per cent (Bureau of Foreign Trade 2018b). Presently, Taiwan is among
the top four investors in Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia (Yang 2017, 49).
President Trump’s imposition of tariffs on Chinese products as part of the
US–China trade war will further prompt ASEAN-centred investments.
Outbound investments to Southeast Asia are expected to grow to 24 per cent
of Taiwan’s total foreign investment (DBS Bank 2016, 4).
The NSP is different from the previous Go South policy in certain key
aspects. According to the NSP’s 2016 Guidelines and Promotion Plan, its pri-
mary goals are to ‘forge a sense of economic community’ by expanding bilat-
eral exchanges with 18 target countries and to form ‘a new model for
economic development’. First, the NSP covers not only ASEAN states, but also
4 The first phase of the Go South policy (1994–1996) covered Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam; the second phase (1997–1999) and the third phase
of the policy (2002–2008) extended the scope to include Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, as well as
Australia and New Zealand. Therefore, the six South Asian countries (India, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Pakistan) are new additions in the NSP.
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Australia, New Zealand, India and other South Asian countries. However,
based on economic growth rates, ASEAN is evidently the main driver and the
most important target (Hsu and Ming-Hsun 2018, 11). Second, the Go South
policy deemed Southeast Asia to be a ‘cheaper’ manufacturing base for prod-
ucts that would be exported to US and European markets, whereas the NSP
focuses on the increasing purchasing capacity of ASEAN’s emerging middle
class. Finally, rather than seeking only to redirect Taiwan’s outbound invest-
ments, the NSP encourages foreign investments in Taiwan and broadens the
scope of exchanges to include education and tourism.
The NSP encompasses four main tasks: promoting economic collaboration,
conducting talent exchange, sharing resources and forging regional links (NSP
Promotion Plan 2016). The Taiwan cabinet subsequently outlined five flag-
ship projects that centre on agriculture, innovative industries, medical
cooperation, forums for policy and youth exchanges, and talent cultivation
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). Six of 18 NSP countries, including
Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and India, were also
identified as priority nations for the new initiative (Li 2017). Initial steps
include the establishment of the Taiwan–Asia Exchange Foundation, which
initiated the annual Yushan Forum to facilitate semi-official talks, and the
funding of infrastructure and development projects (Yang and Chiang 2018).
In response to a more than 50 per cent decrease in Chinese tourists to
Taiwan, the easing of visa requirements for citizens of Vietnam, Thailand
and the Philippines has attracted additional ASEAN tourists (Everington
2017; Hsu and Ming-Hsun 2018, 16).
In 2018, additional efforts focused on medical and agricultural cooperation
with ASEAN states. The government tasked Taiwan hospitals with establishing
medical centres in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam
to study healthcare conditions and train medical professionals (Lee 2018).
Besides bilateral exchanges of agricultural professionals, Taiwan established an
agricultural demonstration zone adjacent to Jakarta and assisted with the irri-
gation infrastructure and offered technical advice to local famers (Han 2018).
These capacity-building initiatives could also intensify Taiwan’s cooperation
with the US under its regional training framework (Yang 2017, 15).
Furthermore, amid increasing Chinese influence owing to the One Belt, One
Road initiative, the NSP is expected to provide a foundation for upgrading the
status of Taiwan by signing trade and investment agreements (Hsu 2017, 82).
The recognition of diplomatic privileges and immunities
The implementation of the NSP is premised on the extent of ASEAN states’
engagement with Taipei under the one-China policy that upholds the practice
of non-recognition of Taipei. An important factor is the effectiveness of
Taiwan’s diplomatic missions and staff members based in ASEAN. Legally
and practically, the various degrees of diplomatic treatment reflect a gradual
view of recognition in IR. Notably, privileges and immunities are primarily
granted to embassies and envoys from recognized states with the purpose of
allowing them to carry out diplomatic duties. These legal rights include
exemptions from local legal proceedings and taxes, as well as the protection of
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official correspondences with home countries (Jennings and Watts 1996,
1087–1101; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961).5
The status of de facto embassies and diplomats
Taiwan’s representative offices abroad are technically not ‘embassies’ and the
heads of such offices are not called ‘ambassadors’. However, they are deemed
to be functional equivalents. Their status thus falls outside the normal legal
framework due to the lack of diplomatic relations. Significantly, non-recogni-
tion policies of ASEAN countries do not prevent the conferral of privileges
and immunities on Taiwan’s representative offices and diplomats posted from
the ministries in charge of foreign affairs, trade and defence. The significant
upgrade in Taiwan’s diplomatic privileges and immunities occurred during
the Go South policy, the predecessor to the NSP, in the 1990s. The PRC, in
relation to its position on Taiwan’s external economic agreements, has been
less cautious about imposing ‘red lines’ on the diplomatic treatment of Taipei.
Presumably, the fact that the diplomatic status accorded to Taiwanese offices
and envoys is based on practice rather than law has made it easy to change
and difficult to challenge. This status can be interpreted as functional instead
of political and thus can be justified as not contravening Beijing’s one-
China principle.
In line with their non-recognition policies, ASEAN states have two interre-
lated considerations. Granting better treatment to Taiwan will allow reciprocal
status for their representative offices and diplomats based in Taipei. More
importantly, increasing the degree of mutual recognition and exchanges will
facilitate the inflow of Taiwan’s investment and transfer of technology to
Southeast Asia. Prior to the Go South policy, President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to
Singapore in 1989 was noteworthy. Although Singapore never had diplomatic
relations with the ROC, its intensive military and trade cooperation made it
Taiwan’s closest friend in ASEAN. In Singapore, Lee was addressed as the
‘President from Taiwan’ rather than ‘of the ROC’ or ‘of Taiwan’, but he met
with key political figures including Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. (Lee
2000, 628–629).
During a later trip in 1994, Lee met with Philippine President Fidel Ramos
to discuss the development of Subic Bay, with Indonesian President Suharto to
discuss projects on Batam Island and with Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej in
Bangkok (Leifer 2001, 179; Jing 2016b, 16–17). These meetings with heads of
state helped transform the status of Taiwan’s de facto embassies. Before 1990,
Taiwan’s offices had varied and confusing titles, ranging from the ‘Far East
Travel and Trade Centre’ in Malaysia to the ‘Chinese Chamber of Commerce’
in Indonesia (Ku 1995, 286; Jing 2016b, 12). By September 1990, Taiwan had
changed the titles of its institutions in six ASEAN states uniformly to the
‘Taipei Economic and Cultural Office’. Since Taiwan established offices in
Vietnam and Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos remain the only two ASEAN
countries that lack Taiwan’s presence.
5 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961); note that the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (1963) stipulates a narrower scope of privileges and immunities in consular
relations that are primarily for visa and commercial purposes.
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The IR concept of recognition explains the legal significance and the extent
of diplomatic privilege and immunities that ASEAN states have accorded to
Taiwan’s offices and envoys. Diplomatic privileges and immunities were
developed partially as a consequence of sovereign immunity, but they are
functionally distinguishable (Shaw 1986, 393). Based on judicial equality in
international law, sovereign immunity prevents domestic courts from adjudi-
cating in other states (Crawford 2012, 449; Krasner 1999, 14–19). Hence, sover-
eign immunity enables foreign governmental agencies and heads of state in
foreign countries to be immune from local proceedings.
Recognition is critical to sovereign immunity claims. A seminal case involv-
ing Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) occurred in Singapore
proceedings (Singapore Court of Appeals 2004). The case arose from a
Singapore Airlines crash incident in Taiwan during a typhoon, resulting in the
deaths of 83 passengers in 2000. The legal issue was whether Taiwan could be
considered a ‘state’ for the CAA to be entitled to state immunity. Singapore’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to issue a certificate to provide clear guid-
ance on this issue. Yet, the court concluded that ‘recognition is vital’ for sover-
eign immunity (Hwang and Cheng 2017, 16). Having interpreted the
government’s answer as negative and with Singapore’s non-recognition of
Taiwan or the ROC, the court denied the CAA’s claim. This case illustrates
that in domestic law the effects of recognition are more constitutive than
declaratory.
From an IR perspective, diplomatic and sovereign immunities share the
same theoretical premise based on the equality between states. However,
unlike sovereign immunity, special diplomatic rights are granted to foreign
embassies and diplomatic representatives in the host countries. In exceptional
cases, diplomatic privileges and immunities can be granted to unrecognized
entities. The special treatment granted to foreign offices and envoys is meant
to respect the dignity of the countries they represent. Based on the principle of
participatory parity, these rights reinforce the normative dimension of status
recognition, thus ensuring the efficient performance of diplomatic functions in
a way that is on par with that of peer countries (Blunden 2007, 92–95; Fehl
2015, 108–109; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, preamble).
From a psychological perspective, it is presumably more critical to Taiwan
because the degrees of privileges and immunities correspond with the self-
identification as a sovereign state (Zuo 2012, 164–165). For instance, in Taipei’s
view, its representative offices should be treated as official delegations that
represent the state rather than as private institutions. In essence, the privileges
and immunities that ASEAN states have granted to Taiwan symbolize the rec-
ognition of rights under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to
which only recognized sovereign states are entitled. These forms of recognition
reinforce Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty because they demonstrate
legal competence in the international sphere (Krasner 1999, 17).
Diverse practices of ASEAN states
Next, I will examine Taiwan’s relations with various ASEAN states, including
Cambodia, the Philippines, Singapore, Myanmar and Vietnam. As highlighted
above, the case of diplomatic privileges and immunities indicates that
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recognition is a gradual process (Geis 2015, 15–17). Unlike the zero-sum policy
of recognition of statehood, different modes of recognition such as special
rights are compatible with ASEAN’s one-China policy. Tellingly, ASEAN states
have diverse responses to the one-China policy. US allies that are pro-trade
and do not border China, such as Singapore and the Philippines, have granted
Taiwan the highest degrees of diplomatic privileges and immunities. In these
countries, Taiwan’s de facto embassies and diplomats effectively function in a
similar manner to those of recognized states. The driving force behind such a
practice is to benefit economically from Taipei and Beijing and to sustain an
autonomous status between Beijing and Washington from a trade and security
perspective. This stance also conditioned Vietnam’s foreign policy towards
Taiwan after its economic reform in the 1980s. Nevertheless, authoritarian and
less-developed nations such as Cambodia and Laos have echoed Beijing’s one-
China principle by severely restricting engagement with Taiwan. These coun-
tries are highly dependent on China’s economic and military aid and maintain
only marginal trade links with Taiwan.
The legal status of Taiwan’s representative offices is not clearly defined
under domestic law and varies across ASEAN states. Apart from holding vari-
ous degrees of privileges and immunities established through practice and
reciprocity, these offices are uniformly granted consular functions such as the
issuance of passports and visas. Significantly, despite their recognition of
Beijing, Singapore and the Philippines have yet to change the substance of
privileges and immunities accorded to Taiwan. The existing special rights
include the use of diplomatic passports, diplomatic bags and airport privileges
and an exemption from taxes and duties arising from salaries and vehicles
(Executive Yuan 1993, 112–113; Lee 1993, 80; Ku 2005, 8). This wide spectrum
of recognition of diplomatic rights has made cooperation possible and desir-
able. The Taipei Representative Office in Singapore is the most
‘comprehensive’ de facto embassy among the ASEAN states. In addition to
officials from economic and foreign ministries, military personnel from the
defence ministry are also posted to Singapore to facilitate military cooperation.
Frequent visits by Taiwan’s high-profile politicians, such as President Ma
Ying-jeou and Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu, have also made the office’s
close contact with the Singapore government essential (Hsieh 2019, 99–108;
Kuo et al 2019). To reinforce its identity as Taiwan’s official agency, the repre-
sentative office has also followed the advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
to change the full title of the office to ‘Taiwan in Singapore’ on its Facebook
page (Strong 2018). A similar move was followed by the office in Indonesia
and other missions.
From a legal perspective, the case of the Philippines is unique. In 1988 and
1989, pro-Taiwan congressmen proposed the Philippines–Taiwan Relations Act
and the Philippines–Taiwan Beneficial Relations Act, respectively (Lee 1993,
80). The acts were to be modelled after the US Taiwan Relations Act, which
was enacted in response to President Carter’s decision to recognize the PRC.
The purpose of these acts was to ensure Taiwan’s investment and to codify the
diplomatic status of the ‘Pacific Economic and Cultural Centre’, Taiwan’s mis-
sion in Manila, after the severance of diplomatic ties in 1975. These legislative
attempts failed in the early 1990s due to opposition from the Philippine
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Foreign Ministry. Yet, they reinforce bilateral relations on a non-recogni-
tion basis.
Despite its close communist ties with the PRC, Vietnam’s engagement with
Taiwan has been drastically different from that of Cambodia, Laos and
Myanmar. Taiwan’s Go South policy coincided with Vietnam’s Doi Moi eco-
nomic reforms. The fact that Taiwan was Vietnam’s largest investor from 2006
to the early 2010s facilitated bilateral ministerial level visits (Tran 2011, 16;
Yang 2017, 18). In turn, Vietnam expanded Taiwanese diplomats’ privileges
and immunities, such as tax immunity and the use of diplomatic licence plates
(Ku 1999, 417; Chen 2015, 62). However, Hanoi also set a boundary in its one-
China policy by requesting that Taiwan not display the ROC flag or use the
official title ‘Republic of China’ as part of a National Day reception that was
held in a hotel (Lin 2010). Notably, to implement the NSP, Taiwan’s offices
have strengthened efforts in Vietnam and Thailand to promote tourism and
assist Taiwanese universities in attracting students.
Myanmar switched its recognition to Beijing in 1950 and its military junta
adopted a hostile stance towards Taiwan. A 1994 law prevented Myanmar’s
enterprises from having trade and investment relations with countries in the
absence of diplomatic ties, making direct Taiwanese investment in the country
impossible (Chen 2004, 510–511). Nevertheless, Myanmar’s democratic and
economic reforms since the 2010s have altered its position on foreign invest-
ments. In 2016, a Taiwan office was established in Yangon (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2016). As Taiwan’s most recently established office in ASEAN, the rep-
resentative office in Yangon has cautiously focused on trade and indus-
trial promotions.
Among ASEAN countries, Cambodia holds the most rigid one-China pol-
icy. In 1997, the Cambodian government accused Taipei of intervening in
Cambodia’s coup d’etat and ordered the Taiwan office to shut down (Chen
2012, 198). Moreover, Prime Minister Hun Sen recently declared a ban on the
use of ROC flags and prevented the reopening of Taiwan’s office (Phan 2017).
The cases above illustrate ASEAN states’ diverse modes of recognition of
Taiwan’s diplomatic privileges and immunities. The overall trend shows that
in most ASEAN states an increasing degree of diplomatic treatment has been
accorded to Taipei, although this is mostly on a de facto basis and often not
externally discernible. These cases also illustrate the potential scope of
Taiwan’s prospective engagement with ASEAN under the NSP.
The politics of trade and investment agreements
For Taiwan, one priority of the NSP is to conclude and update FTAs and BIAs
with ASEAN countries so as to provide a foundation for joining mega-FTAs in
the Asia–Pacific (Guidelines of the NSP 2016). As with diplomatic privileges
and immunities, these pacts illustrate the various forms of recognition that are
practised with Taiwan in spite of ASEAN’s non-recognition of Taiwan under
the one-China policy. The case of Taiwan shows how policies of recognition
and non-recognition are practised by ASEAN states simultaneously. These
forms of recognition, which reinforce recognition as a gradual process, help
avoid conflicts due to misrecognition, which can be interpreted as unjust or
humiliating (Geis 2015, 6–15). Although these modes of recognition do not
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constitute recognition of statehood in international law, they have salient legal
and political consequences. Beyond the neorealist assumption that economic
agreements are designed to advance economic security and power, the IR con-
cept of recognition, which focuses on identity and status, provides a more
accurate analysis of economic agreements.
Forms of recognition under FTAs and BIAs
Grounded in Hegel’s recognition theory, the world order can be seen as an
intersubjective process where states struggle for the recognition of their identi-
ties (Ringmar 1995, 94; Kochi 2016, 95). Taiwan’s quest for prestige is not sim-
ply for recognition of statehood, but for a unique identity independent of the
PRC. For instance, Taiwan joined the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation as an
‘economy‘ and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a ‘separate customs
territory’. Although these memberships are not conditioned on statehood,
through acknowledgement by the ‘other’ at the international level, they sup-
port the existence of ‘self’.
The PRC’s stance on Taiwan’s participation in international organizations
reflects its practice of either ‘keeping silent’ or opposing Taiwan’s external
agreements. Subject to Beijing’s interpretation of the one-China principle, the
‘red lines’ are actually not fixed and can thus implicitly affect foreign states’
trade negotiations with Taipei. There are two principal parameters. Firstly,
Taipei’s numerous diplomatic titles preclude statehood and recognition as
Taiwan or the ROC. Secondly, cross-strait relations underpin the PRC’s strat-
egy. If Beijing deems that Taipei’s external trade agreements facilitate cross-
strait talks towards peaceful reunification, it will not explicitly obstruct those
agreements, which can be seen as commercial pacts. Otherwise, Beijing will
object to these agreements on the grounds that they purposely serve the polit-
ical end of Taiwan’s independence. Therefore, from Beijing’s point of view,
what matters most is the intention rather than the nature of the FTAs. This
rationale explains China’s contrasting positions on Taiwan’s FTAs during the
presidency of ‘China-friendly’ Ma Ying-jeou and the pro-independence admin-
istrations of Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen.
Undoubtedly, geopolitical contexts have played a key role in Taiwan’s eco-
nomic agreements. Taiwan concluded the FTAs with Singapore and New
Zealand during the Ma administration and these external pacts helped lessen
Taiwan’s domestic opposition to forming closer ties with Beijing. Most BIAs
with ASEAN states in the 1990s were concluded due to Taiwan’s stronger eco-
nomic power and investment capacity compared with China’s. In my view, the
Philippines’ newly updated BIA with Taiwan has incurred no retaliation from
Beijing presumably because of the Rodrigo Duterte government’s stance on the
South China Sea Arbitration. Although these instances prompted by multifa-
ceted factors may be perceived as exceptions to Taiwan’s treaty-making cap-
acity, these increasing exceptions have enhanced the country’s identity and
status from an IR perspective. Hence, the existing FTAs and the BIAs that
formed part of the NSP helped reinvigorate the recognition of Taiwan, even
though such recognition does not amount to recognition of statehood in inter-
national law.
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Although ASEAN is the most established trade bloc in Asia, Taiwan’s
accession to the organization is infeasible because Article 6 of the ASEAN
Charter requires ‘recognition by all ASEAN Member States’ as a prerequisite
for membership. The one-China policy thus constitutes a legal obstacle for
Taiwan’s engagement with ASEAN. In the early 2000s, Taiwan intended to fol-
low the approach of key Asia–Pacific economies, such as Japan and South
Korea, by signing an ‘ASEAN plus one’ FTA with ASEAN as a group.
Nevertheless, as both Lee Kuan Yew and Secretary-General of ASEAN Surin
Pitsuwan suggested, an ASEAN–Taiwan FTA is unlikely because of the one-
China policy (Jing 2016a, 201). Ma’s escalated engagement with China facili-
tated Taiwan’s bilateral FTA efforts. In addition to the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement with Beijing, Taiwan secured seven FTAs primarily
with diplomatic allies in Central America (Bureau of Foreign Trade 2018a).
Taiwan’s signing of FTAs with Singapore and New Zealand in 2013 was
significant, as both countries have diplomatic ties and FTAs with China
(Magcamit and Tan 2015, 97–99). Diverging from his predecessor, President
Chen of the DPP, who requested the use of ‘Taiwan’ as the country’s official
title in the FTA, Ma’s acceptance of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
nomenclature ‘separate customs territory’ resolved the political bottleneck
(KMT 2010; Young 2014, 6–16). Since 2016, Beijing has adopted an increasingly
assertive attitude towards the Tsai government and its NSP. It is evidenced by
China’s warning to Australia. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that,
given the changes in cross-strait relations, Beijing now opposes Canberra’s
plan to follow the New Zealand model and sign an FTA with Taipei (Hunter
2018). China similarly increased pressure on ASEAN states with respect to
their trade negotiations with Taiwan.
The strategy of Taiwan is not to focus on signing memoranda of under-
standing (MoUs), which can be concluded by non-state entities. The MoUs’
non-legally binding nature and broadly defined terms also make them unen-
forceable. From the perspective of IR and international law, it is FTAs and
BIAs that fortify identity construction. The status dimension of recognition fur-
ther explains the signing of state-to-state contracts recognizing Taiwan’s equal-
ity and dignity under the normative rules of international law (Krasner 1999,
17). Since sovereign states possess the capacity to conclude treaties, Taiwan’s
legal competence to sign comprehensive economic agreements demonstrates
that it effectively exercises sovereign rights representing its territory and peo-
ple (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, article 6; Crawford
2012, 448).
ASEAN states’ policies of non-recognition of Taiwan allow for and coexist
with diverse modes of recognition under multi-layered agreements. However,
what do FTAs and BIA actually ‘recognize’ without amounting to recognition
of statehood? As exemplified by the 2013 Singapore–Taiwan FTA and the 2017
Philippines–Taiwan BIA, the most important aspects of recognition are as fol-
lows. First, the pacts recognize the authority of Taiwan’s central government
and its effective jurisdiction over a defined territory. Although the agreements
are often concluded between Taiwan’s representative offices in ASEAN states
and their counterparts in Taipei, their semi-official nature does not diminish
the agreements’ binding effect and recognition of equal status. Second, the
agreements facilitate bilateral recognition of legal systems and statutes,
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including the rules of origin and conformity assessment procedures for prod-
ucts. Professional licences and educational certificates are also mutually recog-
nized. Third, BIAs and modern FTAs that incorporate investment chapters
recognize the promotion and protection of investment against certain govern-
mental measures such as illegal expropriation. Fourth, various sections in bilat-
eral instruments authorize joint task forces to carry out economic cooperation
tasks and conduct periodic reviews. These mechanisms thus recognize the
legitimacy of government-to-government interactions at the ministerial level.
Finally, the dispute settlement mechanisms that address state-to-state disputes
and investor–state disputes recognize the legal equality and capacity of the
respective governments.
Priorities of the NSP
To understand Taiwan’s NSP, it is essential to assess the impact that the Go
South policy had on Taiwan’s BIAs. When FTA negotiations are unable to be
launched, BIAs that focus on investment serve as a ‘plan B’ to advance
Taiwan’s trade strategy. ASEAN states concluded BIAs with Taiwan in the
1990s in order to attract much-needed foreign investment. The present NSP,
however, exists in a rather different geopolitical context. By 2030, the combined
ASEAN economy is expected to have ascended from the sixth largest to the
fourth largest in the world (Wong 2018). Thus, in 2015, when the ASEAN
Economic Community was founded and followed by a process of rapid inte-
gration, it became urgent for Taiwan to update existing BIAs and conclude
additional FTAs with ASEAN states (Hsieh 2017, 341–342). Arguably, ASEAN
governments have also used these agreements with Taipei as a display of the
autonomy of their own foreign policy without succumbing to
Beijing’s demands.
Taiwan first signed BIAs with two ASEAN states, Singapore and Indonesia,
in 1990 and subsequently concluded similar pacts with the Philippines,
Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand (Jing 2016b, 10). Aside from the Philippines,
the other five ASEAN countries also concluded double taxation avoidance
agreements with Taipei. Notably, Malaysia had initially declined to sign a BIA
due to the one-China policy. In 1991, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (Congress)
passed a resolution that conditioned a US$27 billion investment in Malaysia by
Taiwan’s China Steel Corporation on the signing of a BIA, which would guar-
antee the protection of Taiwanese investments (Chen 2012, 215). This reso-
lution spurred the finalization of the Malaysia–Taiwan BIA in 1993.
Other than concluding new FTAs and BIAs, a key objective of Taiwan’s
NSP is to update existing BIAs. This is primarily because these pacts are out-
dated in terms of scope and protection and are unable to cover today’s diverse
investments. While BIAs’ dispute resolution provisions imply recognition of
sovereign equality and the legitimacy of legal systems, the lack of procedural
guidance can render them futile. For instance, some BIA provisions only man-
date that disputes ‘be settled amicably through negotiations’ and can hardly
resolve disputes in practice. For most countries, it is common for BIAs to des-
ignate the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, as part
of the World Bank, as a forum for investors to sue host states. Nevertheless,
this option is unavailable to Taiwanese companies because of the country’s
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non-UN member status. A related problem surfaced after the protests in
Vietnam against China’s deployment of an oil rig in the South China Sea in
2014. The anti-China rioters indiscriminately damaged 224 Taiwanese factories
(Flannery 2014). The absence of multiple arbitral options and detailed proce-
dures has largely hindered the effectiveness of the 1993 BIA.
By contrast, new-style agreements have stronger protection mechanisms.
The ability of ASEAN investors to challenge the Taiwanese government’s
measures before international forums also strengthens recognition of Taiwan’s
identity and status. For example, the 2013 Singapore–Taiwan FTA substantially
improved the investor–state dispute settlement procedures under the 1990
BIA. This FTA was utilized as the legal basis for a claim that Singapore’s
Surfeit Harvest Investment Holding brought against Taiwan in 2017 (Perry
2017). As Taiwan’s first-ever investor–state dispute, Surfeit initiated proceed-
ings against the ‘Republic of China (Taiwan)’ before the Hague-based
Permanent Court of Arbitration. Albeit as a defendant, the case demonstrates
Taiwan’s standing before international tribunals.
In addition to the necessity for including more detailed arbitral procedures,
the widened scope of protected investment and the enhanced role of govern-
ments in negotiations fortified various forms of recognition of Taiwan. One
notable achievement under the NSP is the conclusion of the
Philippines–Taiwan BIA in 2017 (Marston and Bush 2018). This pact not only
replaces the previous 1992 BIA, but also reflects Manila’s flexible diplomacy.
Despite Beijing’s protests, the Duterte government adopted an assertive stance
on economic diversification by attracting Taiwanese investments, thus show-
casing its ‘independent’ status in foreign policy (Tiezzi 2017).
The updated Philippines–Taiwan BIA expands the ambit of investment pro-
tection from the manufacturing sector to other areas such as the services indus-
try, real estate and intellectual property (Strong 2018). It also accords the
respective government official roles in assisting enterprises in negotiations and
provides investors with multiple legal remedies. In December 2018, New Delhi
also signed an updated BIA with Taipei after the approval from the cabinet
chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Hsu 2018). India is a critical RCEP
country and the NSP’s major target in South Asia. This BIA benefits Modi’s
‘Make in India’ campaign. More significantly, it sent a signal that, like the
Philippines’, India’s non-recognition of Taiwan does not preclude the conclu-
sion of a BIA.
The next potential breakthrough may be a BIA with Indonesia. In 2012,
government-funded think tanks in Taipei and Jakarta completed a feasibility
study of an economic cooperation agreement and affirmed its positive trade
impact (Elizabeth and Tu 2014, 125–130). A bilateral MoU on comprehensive
economic cooperation concluded in 2018 will facilitate investment and indus-
trial dialogues necessary for an investment pact (Chou and Huang 2018). A
new feasibility study of an economic agreement, which is expected to be
released in 2019, will also form the basis for potential negotiations.
Notably, the political aspects of the economic agreements that contribute to
gradual recognition of Taiwan are more prominent on a multilateral basis.
Beyond the neorealist trade benefits, these pacts will further strengthen
Taiwan’s identity and status in inter-state affairs. Hence, the NSP’s objective is
to facilitate Taiwan’s participation in mega-regional agreements such as the
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RCEP and the revised TPP, which is now known as the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). After Trump’s
withdrawal from the original TPP, the remaining 11 parties led by Japan
amended selected provisions and concluded the revised pact in 2018. Australia
became the sixth nation to ratify the CPTPP in October 2018, and the pact
became effective 60days later (Greenfield 2018). The fact that China is not a
party to the CPTPP and its provision open to ‘any State or separate customs
territory’ removes major obstacles for Taiwan’s accession. However, Taiwan’s
2018 referendum that supported a continued ban on food imports from prefec-
tures that were affected by the Fukushima nuclear disaster cast a shadow on
Tokyo’s support for Taipei’s CPTPP membership (Ko 2018).
Also essential to the NSP and Taiwan’s supply chain, the RCEP encom-
passes all of the ten ASEAN states. RCEP negotiations commenced in 2012 and
are expected to be finalized in 2019 (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade 2018). When it is launched, the RCEP will be the world’s largest
FTA, as it will cover 30 per cent of the global gross domestic product, double
that of the CPTPP (Hsieh 2018, 102–103). Nevertheless, Taiwan’s entry into the
RCEP is presently inconceivable because China is a key player in the pact. The
RCEP allows ‘any ASEAN partner’ or ‘other external economic partners’ to
accede to the agreement, but the conditions and procedures for accession are
premised on the consensus of all parties. Although Hong Kong became an
FTA partner of ASEAN, it is unlikely that Taiwan could follow the same
approach. As it is far more complex than bilateral pacts, the RCEP exhibits the
prospective limit of the NSP and Taiwan’s accession to mega-
regional agreements.
Conclusion
The evolution of Taiwan’s engagement with Southeast Asia under the one-
China policy is a notable yet underexplored research topic in international law
and IR. Recognition and non-recognition are conventionally perceived as clear
opposites. Nonetheless, distinct from the legal view of recognition, ASEAN
states’ substantive relations with Taiwan demonstrate the IR concept of recog-
nition as a gradual process. Examining diplomatic relations and economic
agreements, the article has argued that ASEAN countries have established
diverse forms of practice that recognize Taipei. A constructive analysis of this
practice revealed that this recognition is gradual and does not amount to rec-
ognition of statehood. These modes of recognition coexist with and are essen-
tial to decreasing conflicts owing to a policy of non-recognition.
The article has contributed to an evolving literature on the IR concept of
recognition rooted in Hegel’s ‘struggle for recognition’ argument and applied
it to a modern notion premised on identity and status in interstate affairs.
Using this theoretical framework, the article has found that a wide-ranging
degree of diplomatic privileges and immunities are accorded to Taiwan’s de
facto embassies and envoys in the absence of diplomatic ties. Furthermore, the
conclusion of several bilateral trade and investment pacts has galvanized vari-
ous patterns of recognizing Taiwan’s treaty-making capacity and its legitimacy
in official cooperation. The cases collectively demonstrate the rarely analysed
compatibility between recognition and a policy of non-recognition.
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From a geopolitical perspective, these findings provided a fresh perspective
on Taiwan’s pivot to ASEAN, such as the Go South policy and the NSP, vis-
a-vis the changing dynamics of relations between China and ASEAN.
Significantly, the contribution of the NSP is not only to enhance the recogni-
tion of Taiwan from an IR perspective, but also to consolidate the regional
supply chain. The NSP can be a new model for foreign aid and present an
approach distinct from China’s oft-criticized debt diplomacy. The next step of
the initiative should link the transfer of Taiwan’s technology and service
industry expertise to the further entry into the Southeast Asian market.
Although ASEAN countries’ responses to the NSP have been largely positive,
they are inevitably cautious about the impact on their respective ties with
Beijing. The Taiwan government should be reminded that the extent of the
NSP will develop in tandem with cross-strait relations. Furthermore, as
ASEAN states refer to each other’s international law practice, the modality and
scope of recognition of Taiwan in either its diplomatic status or economic
agreements could be extended to the rest of the bloc. Accordingly, the analysis
of state practice in this article has enhanced the interdisciplinary understand-
ing of recognition theory in IR and international law.
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